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In November 2000, exit poll interviews 
with voters in Florida indicated that Al 
Gore won the state. As a result, many 
television networks declared Gore the 
winner of Florida, a pivotal state to win 
ning the presidency in 2000. Only a few 
hours later, the first vote tallies from the 
Florida Secretary of State's office re 
vealed that George W. Bush was in fact 
leading in Florida. After 45 days of re 
counts and lawsuits, it was clear that the 
exit polls were wrong; Bush had won the 
state by the narrowest of margins. As a 
result of the flawed exit poll' the media 
and pollsters scoured and reanalyzed the 
methodology used in 2000 to prepare 
and correct for the 2004 presidential 
election. The old system, Voter News 
Service (VNS) was scrapped entirely, 
and Edison-Mitofsky Research was cho 
sen to implement a new and more accu 
rate national exit poll in 2004 by a 
consortium of news organizations re 
tained by the Associated Press called the 
National Election Pool (NEP). What hap 
pened? Exit poll results from Edison 
Mitofsky showed John Kerry ahead in 
Ohio, Florida, and New Mexico-all 
states which he lost to Bush in 2004. 
In addition to the overall exit poll re 
sults being skewed, comparative vote 
results for subgroups, such as that for 
Latino voters, also appeared to be wrong. 
The NEP reported on November 2, 2004, 
that Bush won 45% of the Latino vote, a 
10-point gain from 2000. In contrast, an 
exit poll of only Latino voters conducted 
by the William C. Velasquez Institute 
reported that Bush won only 32% of the 
Latino vote. Moreover, a pre-election 
survey of Latino voters by the Tomas 
Rivera Policy Institute, a non-partisan 
think tank with more than 10 years expe 
rience polling Latino voters, reported 
Bush garnering just 30% of the vote (see 
Leal et al. 2005). 
What explains such discrepancies? 
One possibility is the methodology used 
to select the precincts where exit poll 
interviews are conducted is faulty. Ide 
ally, the respondents in the exit poll sur 
vey will be accurate representatives of 
the entire city or state in which the elec 
tion is being held. However, if the exit 
poll interviews respondents that are too 
conservative or too liberal, too young or 
too old, too poor or too rich, or too 
White, it could skew the overall results 
by a wide margin, even after weights are 
employed. Existing exit polls are often 
unreliable because the members of the 
demographic subgroups interviewed for 
the poll are not necessarily representative 
of all members of their demographic 
subgroup. What's more, with a growing 
number of Americans voting via absentee 
ballot, Election Day-only exit polls2 
could miss a large segment of the 
electorate. 
Since the November 2004 presidential 
election considerable media coverage has 
focused on the exit poll controversy. A 
December 2004 New York Times article 
noted that Congressman John Conyers 
(D-MI) asked Edison-Mitofsky "to turn 
over raw data collected in Election Day 
exit polls, for investigation of any dis 
crepancies between voter responses and 
certified election results" (Associated 
Press 2004); a January 2005 Washington 
Post headline read, "Report Acknowl 
edges Inaccuracies in 2004 Exit Poll" 
(Morin and Deane 2005); and CNN 
noted in January 2005 that the Kerry 
numbers were "overstated," and claimed 
that "CNN did not air those inaccurate 
results or post them on its website." 
Thus, many scholars and pundits reached 
the conclusion that new alternatives to 
the traditional exit poll may be 
warranted. 
Specifically, we pose two important 
methodological questions pertaining to 
the science behind exit polls: (1) what is 
the most accurate sampling technique 
for polling racial and ethnic voters in a 
diverse setting, and (2) how should exit 
polls account for early and absentee 
votes not cast on Election Day? To an 
swer these questions, we implemented 
an alternative sampling exit poll in the 
City of Los Angeles during the 2005 
mayoral election and compared our re 
sults to the exit poll implemented by the 
Los Angeles Times. We then compared 
both polls to the actual election results. 
In short, the different methodologies 
accounted for different results, suggest 
ing that new approaches to exit polling 
are welcome. 
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The Good, The Wrong, and 
The Ugly 
The academic literature regarding exit 
polls focuses broadly on two areas, 
methodology and human interactions 
effects. Generally speaking, exit poll 
methodology is comprised of two com 
ponents, proper sampling techniques and 
the logistical practicalities involved in 
administering an exit poll. The conven 
tional wisdom is that election projections 
should be made where precincts are 
randomly selected (Mitofsky 1989). 
However, there is growing belief in the 
literature regarding general polling tech 
niques that non-probability sampling, 
where respondents are recruited and not 
randomly selected, might yield more ac 
curate results (Couper 2000; Fiorina and 
Krosnick 2005). Non-probability sam 
pling, or quota sampling, has been 
sharply criticized by the establishment 
(Mitofsky 1999), but declining response 
rates (Groves and Couper 1998) have led 
to questions about the true randomness 
of conventional random sampling tech 
niques. And although lower response 
rates do not seem to substantively affect 
the results of the random polls (Keeter 
et al. 2000) the successful use of Intermet 
polls has provoked thoughtful discussion 
on sampling techniques which are appro 
priate for the web, but not necessarily for 
a conventional exit poll (Fiorina and 
Krosnick 2005). 
This discussion, however, is largely in 
the arena of survey polls, not exit polls, 
but there is no telling what the future 
might hold. There are a growing number 
of reasons why contemporary polling 
techniques would be required. For 
instance, the Edison-Mitofsky 2004 
presidential election exit poll could not 
conduct -a true exit poll in Oregon be 
cause Oregonians cast their ballots 
through the mail. The growing discus 
sion, and actual use in goverument spon 
sored pilot programs, regarding voting 
with eBallots will also increase the 
move to conduct exit polling over the 
web. The sheer number of elections and 
surprise elections, such as the Califomia 
recall, will also require greater flexibility 
in polling techniques. Should Intermet 
polling produce more reliable results 
than pen and paper exit polling and 
should more states follow Oregon's vot 
ing method, or witness an increase in 
early voting (such as in Florida, Califor 
nia, Texas), the non-probability versus 
random sampling debate will grow. The 
use of absentee ballots and expanded 
election periods, as opposed to election 
days, will further lead to questions about 
the validity of traditional sampling 
techniques. 
While the current debate regarding 
sampling continues, practical discussions 
regarding the relationship between the 
respondent and surveyor have a long 
tradition. Common sense tells us that 
human interactions will produce certain 
biases in any scientific experiment. Drop 
those interactions into a given social 
context, and those biases are likely to 
multiply. The social context can range 
from the respondent's likelihood to an 
swer sensitive questions honestly (Aqui 
lino 1994; Bishop and Fisher 1995; 
Benson 1941) to the influence socioeco 
nomic status and ethnicity contribute to 
the validity of the survey results (Free 
man 1969; Welch et al. 1973; Weeks and 
Moore 1981; Hurtado 1994). There are 
also limited contributions on the environ 
mental context of poll taking, such as the 
time a poll is administered (Busch and 
Lieske 1985) or whether the climate af 
fects the accuracy of polls (Doob 2001). 
The business of predicting elections, 
however, goes beyond social and envi 
ronmental contexts. The political circum 
stances of calling elections present exit 
polling with a substantial public relations 
problem. The difficulty is that incorrect 
predictions can be satisfactory from a 
statistical standpoint, yet quite unsatisfac 
tory when those results are inserted into 
a politically charged atmosphere. George 
Gallup's career was catapulted by cor 
rectly predicting that Franklin D. Roose 
velt would win the election in 1936 even 
though most straw polls predicted a win 
for Alfred Landon (Fiorina and Krosnick 
2005, 1). Twenty years later, Gallup pre 
dicted that Dewey would defeat Truman, 
and even though the Dewey prediction 
was statistically more sound3 and within 
the margin of error than the Roosevelt 
prediction, some of the public reacted to 
the failed prediction with charges of 
fraud (Committee on Analysis of Pre 
election Polls 1948-1949, 599). 
After the 2000 presidential election, a 
report produced for CNN by Joan Kon 
ner, James Risser and Ben Wattenberg 
(Konner et al. 2001) on television's per 
formance on the night of the election 
concluded that exit polls had "lost much 
of the value it had for projecting election 
results in close elections." People are not 
only less inclined to respond to exit polls, 
but the inability of the exit polls to deal 
with shifts in the number of absentee vot 
ers and early voters were further eroding 
their reliability with each succeeding 
election cycle (Konner et al. 2001, 3). 
Following the 2000 presidential elec 
tion polling debacle, Edison Media Re 
search and Mitofsky Intemnational were 
charged with conducting a more accurate 
exit poll for the 2004 presidential elec 
tion by the National Election Pool 
(NEP). The media affiliates that pooled 
resources for VNS wanted the most reli 
able data possible, to report on election 
night in 2004. While Edison-Mitofsky 
Research sought to address the decline in 
the reliability of exit polls, the results 
were disappointing. The 2004 presiden 
tial election exit poll overstated projec 
tions for John Kerry within precincts 
on average by over 6 points (Mitofsky 
2005, 31) and each of the six press re 
leases issued by Warren/Mitofsky during 
the election wrongly placed Kerry ahead 
in the race (Morin 2004). Some tried to 
attribute the skewed polling numbers to 
voter fraud (Baiman et al. 2005), but the 
most compelling explanation has been 
that differential non-response rates by 
Democrats and Republicans have signifi 
cantly skewed the predictive power of 
exit polls (Mitofsky 2005; Liddle 2005). 
This could be based on non-response 
pattems, or could be based on precinct 
selection. If too few "Republican" pre 
cincts were selected to represent the true 
result in the state, Bush's numbers might 
appear low. Thus, selecting the best pre 
cincts to represent an entire state is ex 
tremely important. 
Predicting elections has never been an 
insular affair, but the difference between 
a good call and a correct one can be at 
the mercy of political context. For in 
stance, the Edison-Mitofsky regime 
overstated John Kerry's national num 
bers by 2.5 percentage points in 2004, 
which was not much larger than the 
overestimation of Bill Clinton's numbers 
in 1992 by the television networks 
(Morin 2004). The only difference is 
Bill Clinton won in 1992 and so it mat 
tered little. But the calls for Al Gore 
and John Kerry have brought attention 
to previous overstatements for one party 
over another, and with some justifica 
tion. Warren Mitofsky (2003, 51) gath 
ered that within-precinct error in the exit 
polls for senate and govemor races in 
1990, 1994, and 1998 showed an under 
statement of the Democratic candidate 
in 20% of the 180 polls during that 
time period and an overstatement 38% 
of the time. The CNN's report on the 
network's performance on Election 
Night 2000 (Konner et al. 2001, Appen 
dix 4) found that the exit polls over 
stated the Gore vote in 22 states and 
overstated the Bush vote in nine states. 
While the history of predicting elec 
tions has seen its share of the good, the 
wrong, and the ugly, it is growing in 
creasingly vital that new sampling tech 
niques are used to accurately depict the 
electorate. Incorrect predictions could 
foment an erosion of public confidence 
in exit polls and the electoral system in 
general, and decrease the response rates 
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of those who view polling regimes as 
serving a political agenda. Incorrect exit 
polls could also be used by policy mak 
ers and pundits to shape public policy. 
For example, when President Bush an 
nounced the nomination of then White 
House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez for 
attomey general, many pundits noted it 
was because Bush did so well among 
Latino voters, winning an estimated 
45%. Since then, numerous media orga 
nizations and several scholars have re 
vised the numbers downward, likely in 
the mid-30s (see Leal et al. 2005). Exit 
polls hold considerable value for our po 
litical system. In principle, the use of 
exit polls represents an important ac 
knowledgement that the interests and 
opinions of the electorate are an impor 
tant component of our political system. 
In practice, they play an important role 
in the strategic decisions of politicians 
and political elites, and they provide the 
media with an objective resource for 
evaluating the quality of the bonds be 
tween our representatives and their con 
stituents (Lavrakas et al. 1995, 3-22). 
Although exit polls are a common occur 
rence in the United States, they are sur 
prisingly uncommon in other modem 
democracies, such as Canada (Brown 
et al. 2004). In elections in the Philip 
pines, Central America, and Russia, exit 
polls are often used by third parties to 
provide a check against voter fraud and 
to gauge the underlying sentiments of the 
citizenry (Mitofsky 1989). 
Since 1948 and the birth of the 
modem-day exit poll in 1967 (Levy 
1983, 54), the stakes of blown calls have 
grown steadily. The "early call" of the 
1980 presidential election by the media 
may have helped to reduce tumout 
among Democrats (Crespin and Vander 
Wielen 2002; Carpini 1984; Jackson 
1983) which could have had an impact 
on close congressional races. The early 
call for Al Gore in Florida probably led 
to a loss of votes for Bush in the Florida 
panhandle (Sobel and Lawson 2001). 
Most recently, the 2004 presidential elec 
tion exit poll was marred by overstated 
projections which surpassed one standard 
error in more than half the states (Mitof 
sky 2005, 3). These missteps will cer 
tainly not contribute positively to 
correcting the differential non-response 
rates which are in tumn contributing to 
the inability to make more accurate calls, 
and new sampling techniques must be 
experimented with to increase the preci 
sion, and credibility, of exit polling. 
Exit Polling Methodology 
Practitioners and consultants of exit 
poll projects spend considerable time 
designing and implementing their meth 
odology. While a telephone survey has 
the advantage of randomly calling any 
registered voter within the state, an exit 
poll is economically limited to a small 
number of sites. Ideally, exit pollsters 
would set up stations at every single pre 
cinct within a jurisdiction, so that no 
voter is left out. Of course, it is not real 
istic to recruit 20,000 volunteers to staff 
each of the 20,000 precincts in a state 
like Califomia. Thus, the key is picking 
a select number of precincts that accu 
rately represent the full universe of 
20,000 throughout a state. If the "wrong" 
precincts are selected, the results may be 
biased. Therefore, exit poll research 
teams take considerable care to select 
precincts. In fact, this is the most impor 
tant step in exit polling. However, the 
selection criteria may still be flawed, as 
recent presidential elections have re 
vealed. Pollsters may rely on two meth 
ods for choosing their critical sample 
precincts: first, they may put all the pre 
cinct numbers into a hat and randomly 
choose precincts to include, or, second, 
they may purposely choose precincts to 
fit the size, voter turnout, and racial 
specifications that fit a given election. 
Because pollsters want a large sample 
size and good cross-sections of different 
types of voters, they almost always rely 
on a purposive random sample that al 
lows them to hand pick the precincts to 
include. 
It is important that the methodologist 
is familiar with the universe they are 
interested in sampling, including the geo 
graphic distinctions and racial and ethnic 
differences within the universe. For an 
exit poll in the City of Los Angeles, 
pollsters would want to capture an accu 
rate representation of all Los Angeles 
voters. For example, if 50% of voters are 
White, 25% Latino, 17% Black, and 8% 
Asian, it is important that these same 
ratios are reflected in who gets inter 
viewed. Because there are not enough 
resources to set up exit polling stations at 
all 1,700 precincts in Los Angeles, poll 
sters select a sample of about 50 to 60 
precincts, while also keeping the geogra 
phy and demographics of the city in 
mind. The easiest way to do this would 
be to pick precincts that most closely 
resemble the overall demographics of 
city voters. For example, voting precinct 
# 9007129, situated in North Hollywood, 
has a population that is 49% White, 24% 
Latino, 15%o Black, and 7%o Asian 
almost a microcosm of the entire City of 
Los Angeles. Or is it? 
The reality is that the great majority of 
voters do not live in such racially inte 
grated neighborhoods. Instead, most vot 
ers reside-and vote-in precincts that 
are racially homogenous. Thus, the 
White, Latino, Black, or Asian voters in 
that North Hollywood precinct may not 
be representative of the "typical" White, 
Latino, Black, or Asian voter in Los An 
geles. According to an analysis of geo 
graphic segregation by the University of 
Michigan Population Studies Center, Los 
Angeles racial groups are still very much 
divided (Farley 2001; see also Logan 
2002). On a racial residential segregation 
index of dissimilarity, where a value of 0 
is perfect integration and a value of 100 
is extreme segregation, Los Angeles is 
viewed as highly segregated. Farley's 
analysis provides an index of dissimilar 
ity for each racial group vis-a-vis one 
another and reported a White-Black 
value of 77, a White-Latino value of 71, 
a White-Asian value of 55, and a Latino 
Black value of 61 (2001). Given these 
residential distinctions, we wonder 
whether Latinos who vote at the 28th 
Street YMCA in East Los Angeles, 
which resides in a precinct which has a 
population that is 95% Latino, differ 
from Latinos who voted at the heteroge 
neous precinct in North Hollywood. And 
what if those Latinos at the 28th Street 
YMCA precinct are excluded from the 
exit poll? Will the overall Latino sample 
be flawed? Similarly, questions may arise 
about Asian Americans who vote at the 
Korean Resource Center (61% Asian 
population) and Blacks who vote at the 
Crenshaw United Methodist Church 
(88% Black population). In a city like 
Los Angeles, most citizens vote in pre 
cincts where their racial group is a ma 
jority. To this end, Los Angeles is not 
unique. Data from the University of 
Michigan Population Studies Center, re 
ported in Table 1, reveal that residential 
segregation is still a significant issue in 
all of America's largest cities, an impor 
tant consideration in exit poll precinct 
selection. 
Is the precinct that looks like a mi 
crocosm of the city, really a microcosm 
of the city, or is it an anomaly? A more 
accurate representation of racial and 
ethnic voters, and therefore the city at 
large, might be found if we conducted 
most of the exit poll interviews in high 
concentration racial precincts instead 
of mixed-race precincts. This sampling 
strategy is supported by data from the 
Los Angeles city clerk precinct list. 
In 2005, only 18% of precincts-less 
than one in five-had no racial or eth 
nic group as a majority, leaving 82% 
of precincts in Los Angeles comprised 
mostly of one racial group or another. 
In full, 38% of precincts were majority 
Latino, 37% majority White, 7% 
majority Black, and 1% majority 
Asian. 
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Table 1 
Index of Racial Segregation 
by City, 2000 
White- White 
city Black Latino 
New York 77 64 
Los Angeles 77 71 
Chicago 88 64 
Houston 78 66 
Philadelphia 82 70 
Phoenix 63 63 
San Diego 67 64 
San Antonio 60 55 
Dallas 75 69 
Miami 86 51 
Detroit 68 65 
Washington 84 65 
Boston 78 65 
Denver 71 63 
Seattle 69 51 
Note: Value of 0 reflects pure inte 
gration and value of 100 reflects 
pure segregation. 
Source: Population Studies Center, 
University of Michigan, 2001. 
The 2005 Los Angeles Exit 
Poll Pilot Project 
In an effort to address the exit poll 
controversy, a team of researchers at the 
Center for the Study of Los Angeles at 
Loyola Marymount University (LMU) 
designed an altemative exit poll method 
ology.4 The new method, described as a 
"racially stratified homogenous precinct 
experiment," interviewed voters in pre 
dominantly racially concentrated neigh 
borhoods, and then weighted the final 
results with respect to each racial and 
ethnic group as necessary. A critical 
component to this exercise was the re 
cruitment and training of student exit 
poll interviewers. Participating students 
received a cash stipend, lunch, and mile 
age expenses for their participation in the 
project. No incentives were given for 
completing a higher number of inter 
views; instead, students were instructed 
to closely follow the interviewing guide 
lines. Given the current problems sur 
rounding the 2004 exit poll, this project 
was also an opportunity for students to 
make a visible and meaningful impact on 
the future of exit polling in American 
elections. 
In order for the LMU exit poll project 
to be accurate, it was implemented in a 
rigorous and scientific manner. LMU 
researchers identified 50 precincts to be 
included in the exit poll survey, and two 
students were assigned to each precinct 
to carry out the interviews. Bilingual 
students were used in heavily Latino and 
Asian communities. Exit polling was 
conducted from 7:00 am to 8:00 pm, the 
entire time that the polls were open. 
Prior to the May 17, 2005, election, 
students attended two training sessions 
and received instructions on recruiting 
participants, skip pattern, and the confi 
dentiality of the data. The exit poll im 
plemented a traditional skip pattern and 
replacement strategy.5 The interviews 
were self-administered, meaning that vot 
ers filled out a quick survey card on their 
own, while the students concentrated on 
recruiting voters to participate as they 
left the voting precinct. In total, 100 stu 
dent exit pollsters were needed to carry 
out the project on May 17, 2005. An ad 
ditional 20 students assisted with data 
entry and project implementation. 
Different Polls, Different 
Results 
In May 2005, Los Angeles elected its 
first Latino mayor in more than 130 
years. Once a Mexican city in Alta Cali 
fornia, the city of angels has the largest 
Latino population of any city in the 
United States. However, voters in Los 
Angeles are still predominantly White 
(50% of the electorate), with Latinos 
constituting about 25%, Blacks 17%, and 
Asian Americans 7%. Thus, electing a 
Latino mayor is not a Latino-only phe 
nomenon. While Antonio Villaraigosa 
won an estimated 85% of the Latino vote 
in 2005, he also captured a majority of 
White and Black votes to win the elec 
tion 59% to 41% over incumbent Mayor 
James K. Hahn. While it takes a broad 
coalition to win most public offices 
especially mayor of a diverse city-it 
was Latino voters and Latino candidates 
who received most of the focus. A week 
after the 2005 Los Angeles election, Vil 
laraigosa graced the cover of Newsweek 
magazine with the headline, "Latino 
Power!" An overlooked aspect of this 
election was the ability of Villaraigosa to 
win among Latinos, Blacks, and Whites 
in Los Angeles. However, this may have 
been overlooked because the mainstream 
media reported that Villaraigosa did not 
win a majority of Black or White votes. 
The Los Angeles Times exit poll noted 
that Villaraigosa only captured a majority 
of Latino votes. In contrast, the exit poll 
conducted by Loyola Marymount Uni 
versity found Villaraigosa won among 
Latinos, Blacks, and Whites. 
The Loyola Marymount University 
and Los Angeles Times exit polls show 
many similar patterns and results. How 
ever, there are also some notable differ 
ences. This might be expected given that 
each organization used a somewhat dif 
ferent approach to implementing their 
exit polls. 
First, both exit poll surveys were only 
conducted of voters on Election Day, 
which means that absentee voters are not 
included in the full survey results. To 
account for these missing voters, both 
LMU and the Los Angeles Times 
weighted their data to incorporate absen 
tee voting pattems when the official data 
became available from the city clerk. 
However, considerable differences in 
how the absentee vote was incorporated 
into each exit poll potentially bias the 
results (explained in detail below). In the 
May 17, 2005, election, absentee voters 
made up 27% of the Los Angeles elec 
torate and voted 51.4% to 48.6% in favor 
of Antonio Villaraigosa. However, it is 
the Election Day voters that we are inter 
ested in examining closer. 
The LMU exit poll was carried out in 
50 precincts across Los Angeles, and 
administered in five languages: English, 
Spanish, Chinese, Korean, and Tagolog. 
The Los Angeles Times poll was carried 
out in 59 precincts and available only in 
English and Spanish. In addition, the 
LMU poll specifically chose precincts in 
homogenous racial communities. For 
example, the precincts selected by LMU 
consisted of: 
10 heavily White communities 
10 heavily Latino communities 
10 heavily Black communities 
10 heavily Asian communities 
10 mixed-race communities 
These final 10 precincts were in 
"mixed" or heterogeneous neighbor 
hoods where no group comprised a clear 
majority. According to our analysis of 
precincts in Los Angeles, about one-fifth 
of polling places are located in "mixed" 
communities, with over 80% of polling 
places in racially homogenous communi 
ties. For the most part, Angelinos continue 
to live and vote in racially segregated pre 
cincts. Therefore it is important that the 
respondents to the exit poll come from 
such precincts. In comparison, the Los 
Angeles Times interviewed an over 
whelming majority of its respondents in 
mixed-race precincts, as noted in Table 2. 
While both datasets were weighted to re 
flect the correct percentage that each ra 
cial or ethnic group accounted for within 
the electorate, weighting merely replicates 
the data already gathered, which may al 
ready be invalid. Leal et al. (2005) argue 
that in 2004, Edison-Mitofsky chose the 
wrong precincts in which to interview 
Latinos in Texas, something that weight 
ing could not address. 
Second, given that both studies did not 
include absentee voters, it is important to 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Precincts in Los 
Angeles Exit Polls 
Precinct Type L.M.U. L.A. Times 
80% White 10=20% 10= 17% 
80% Latino 10=20% 04 = 7% 
70% Black 10=20% 04=7% 
45% Asian 10=20% 01 =2% 
Mixed-Race 10=20% 40 =67% 
Total Precincts Selected n =50 n =59 
approximate the Election Day total that 
both candidates received. Since we can 
not know the racial composition or vot 
ing preferences of each absentee voter, 
we only focus on Election Day voters for 
this study. If Villaraigosa received 58.7% 
of the overall vote, and 51.4% of the ab 
sentee vote, it is easy to ascertain his 
share of the Election Day vote, given 
T=total vote; P=precinct vote; A=absen 
tee vote; and S=absentee share of elector 
ate (which the city clerk notes was 27%). 
(1.1) T = (A X S) + (P X (1-S)) 
58.7 - (51.4 X 0.27) 
(1.2) (p X 73) 
Quite simply, Equation 1.2 tells us that 
Villaraigosa must have won 61.4% of the 
precinct vote cast in order to have won 
58.7% citywide, once the absentee votes 
were included. 
Thus, the key is to come to a solution 
that adds up to 61.4%, and not 58.7%, of 
the vote for Antonio Villaraigosa when 
using exit poll data. Any attempts to 
weight the data by final vote percentages 
(which include absentee votes) inappro 
priately assign absentee voting patterns 
to Election Day voters. The LMU poll 
weighted its data based on race/ethnicity 
to avoid this problem and incorporated 
absentee voters using Equation 1.1. The 
Los Angeles Times weighted its precinct 
only data on the final vote tally, 58.7% 
to 41.3%, which included absentee 
voters. 
Table 3a below depicts this simple 
formula for the Loyola Marymount Uni 
versity exit poll data. First, the LMU 
data shows somewhat higher rates of 
support for Villaraigosa among Whites 
and Blacks than does the Los Angeles 
Times data. However, this is consistent 
with Villaraigosa winning 61.4% of the 
Election Day vote total. If we multiply 
the percent support for Villaraigosa times 
the percent of the electorate that each 
group comprised on May 17, we arrive 
at an LMU estimate of 62.1% of the vote 
won by Villaraigosa. 
In contrast, Table 3b shows 
the Los Angeles Times data 
and support for Villaraigosa 
for each racial group. The 
same formula results in a 
57.7% vote share for Villarai 
gosa among the exit poll 
sample, about 4 points too 
low. Given that the Election 
Day sample accounted for 
73% and absentee votes for 
27% of all the votes cast, 
we can determine the final 
outcome for each poll by in 
corporating exit poll data and 
absentee data (which is known from the 
Los Angeles City clerk's office). 
The simple calculations reveal that 
the LMU exit poll, plus absentee voting 
patterns, results in an estimated Villarai 
gosa vote share of 59.2%, about 0.5 
points too high. In comparison, the 
Los Angeles Times exit poll data, plus 
absentee voting patterns, results in an 
estimated Villaraigosa vote share of 
56.0%, about 2.7 points too low. We 
argue that the Los Angeles Times 
results are too low overall, because 
they underestimate Villaraigosa's vote 
share among Blacks and Whites, which 
LMU estimates at 58% and 57%, 
respectively. 
Table 3a 
Loyola Marymount Exit Poll by Race 
Villaraigosa % of Total Contribution 
White 57 0.50 28.2 
Black 58 0.17 9.5 
Latino 86 0.25 21.3 
Asian 41 0.08 3.1 
LMU exit 62.1 0.73 45.3 
Absentee 51.4 0.27 13.9 
LMU Total 59.2 
Actual 58.7 
Difference +0.5 
Table 3b 
Los Angeles Times Exit Poll by Race 
Villaraigosa % of Total Contribution 
White 50 0.50 25.0 
Black 48 0.17 8.2 
Latino 84 0.25 21.0 
Asian 44 0.08 3.5 
LAT exit 57.7 0.73 42.1 
Absentee 51.4 0.27 13.9 
Times Total 56.0 
Actual 58.7 
Difference -2.7 
Finally, when we compare the results 
for racially homogenous and racially het 
erogeneous precincts considerable differ 
ences emerge. Table 4 tabulates vote totals 
for each racial/ethnic group in Los Ange 
les based on whether or not they voted in 
a precinct where their racial/ethnic group 
was the majority (in the LMU dataset). A 
Black voter that voted in a predominantly 
Black precinct is counted in the first row, 
racially homogenous precinct, while a 
Black voter that voted in a predominantly 
Latino, Anglo, Asian, or a mixed-race 
precinct is captured in the second row, "all 
other" precincts. This division allows us 
to determine whether racially homo 
geneous precincts, where most voters live 
and vote, actually report different vote 
patterns. 
Significant vote differences are found 
with respect to homogeneous and het 
erogeneous precincts for every ethnic 
group in Los Angeles. For example, Lat 
inos who voted in heavily Latino pre 
cincts demonstrated an 88.5% vote 
preference for Villaraigosa, compared to 
80.3% among Latinos in non-Latino pre 
cincts. Similarly, White voters in White 
precincts were more likely to vote for 
Villaraigosa. For Blacks and Asians the 
inverse pattern was found. Black voters 
in heavily Black precincts voted for Vil 
laraigosa at 56.2%, com 
pared to 66.7% for Black 
voters in non-Black pre 
cincts,6 and Asian voters 
residing outside Asian pre 
cincts were also more likely 
to vote for Villaraigosa. The 
clear result from this find 
ing is that racially homog 
enous precincts do matter 
in influencing vote patterns. 
Further, this demonstrates 
that a Black voter is not 
just a Black voter, but that 
racial geography is impor 
tant in implementing an 
accurate exit poll. While 
national exit polling outlets 
such as the Los Angeles 
Times or Edison-Mitofsky 
may error in picking too 
few racially homogenous 
precincts, it is also possible 
that ethnic-based exit poll 
ing outlets such as the 
Velasquez Institute or the 
Asian American Legal De 
fense and Education Fund 
may error in focusing only 
on racially homogenous 
precincts. In fact, a propor 
tionate amount of both ra 
cially homogenous and 
mixed-race precincts are 
necessary to reflect 
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Table 4 
Vote for Villaraigosa for Racially Homogenous Precincts 
White Black Latino Asian 
Precinct Type Voters Voters Voters voters 
Racially Homogenous 65.0% 56.2% 88.5% 34.7% 
All Others 56.4% 66.7% 80.3% 50.0% 
Difference +8.6% -10.5% +8.2% -15.3% 
*Racially homogenous precincts represent areas where each racial/ethnic group is 
the majority. For example, Villaraigosa won 88.5% of the Latino vote in heavily 
Latino precincts while he won 80.3% of the Latino vote in precincts where Latinos 
were not a majority. 
the geographic distribution of the voters 
in the geography being polled. 
Implications 
Exit polling is both a science and a 
business, creating many challenges that 
are not always easy to address. Since the 
inception of presidential straw polls, po 
litical parties, candidates, analysts, and 
academics have all devoted considerable 
time to improving the accuracy and relia 
bility of predicting elections. Fifty years 
after the infamous 1954 Gallup Poll that 
incorrectly called the election for Dewey 
over Truman, political scientists continue 
to debate the methodology behind pre 
dicting elections. Building on the errors 
in the 2000 exit poll, the National Exit 
Poll was launched in 2004, state sample 
sizes were increased and deemed more 
accurate, and, in the end, many of the 
same errors were made. In our opinion, 
more debate and research are needed for 
exit polling to address two fundamental 
issues: first, how to accurately include 
and account for minority voters, and sec 
ond, how to accurately include and ac 
count for absentee voters. Both issues 
speak to sample design, and precinct se 
lection in particular is a crucial issue for 
pollsters to consider. 
In 2005, two very different exit poll 
ing methodologies were employed to 
answer the same question: what percent 
of the vote did mayoral candidates in 
Los Angeles win, and how did this vary 
by racial group? The Loyola Marymount 
University exit poll implemented a ra 
cially stratified homogenous precinct 
approach that specifically designated pre 
cincts in predominantly White, Black, 
Latino, and Asian neighborhoods, with a 
handful of mixed-race precincts. The Los 
Angeles Times poll included mostly 
mixed-race precincts and only a few ra 
cially homogenous precincts. The result 
was different results. We argue that the 
racially stratified homogenous precinct 
approach is more accurate because it is a 
more natural, or realistic, approach to 
exit polling in a diverse, and residentially 
segregated city. 
Notes 
* Author names are listed alphabetically. 
The co-authors were also the co-principal inves 
tigators of the Loyola Marymount University 
2005 Los Angeles Mayoral Exit Poll. Thanks 
to Salvador Paniagua and Haven Perez for 
their tremendous research assistance in imple 
menting this project and to the more than 
120 student researchers who participated in 
the exit polling and data entry. Robert Aguinaga 
and Antonio Gonzalez of the Southwest Voter 
Registration and Education Project also pro 
vided valuable assistance in implementing the 
poll. Mark Blumenthal, of mysterypollster.com 
was instrumental in tracking down exit poll 
archives. 
1. While many pundits agree that the 2000 
exit poll contained many errors, some analysis 
does suggest that if a statewide manual recount 
had been instituted in Florida, AI Gore may have 
won the state (Keating and Balz 2001). 
2. In the state of Oregon, which is entirely 
vote-by-mail, pollsters must conduct telephone 
surveys of confirmed voters to ascertain how 
people in the state voted. For more on vote-by 
mail in Oregon, see Karp and Banducci 2000. 
3. The prediction for Truman, however, was 
outside the margin of error. See www.gallup. 
com/poll/content/?ci=1234 for a historical run 
down of Gallup Poll's predictions. 
4. To view full poll results, please visit: 
www.lmu.edu/csla/press/releases_2005/Runoff. 
html. Or, to download the Los Angeles 2005 exit 
poll data, please visit: http://faculty.Washington, 
edu /mbarreto/data/ 
5. Given the number of registered voters and 
anticipated voter turnout, pollsters were required 
to attempt to interview every fifth voter that left 
the precinct. 
6. Interestingly, the LMU exit poll finds that 
both groups of Black voters?those in predomi 
nantly Black precincts and those in mixed-race 
precincts?voted in support of Villaraigosa, in 
contrast to the findings by the Los Angeles 
Times poll. This makes the Black sample in 
the Times poll even more suspect given that 
most of their Black sample came from mixed 
race precincts. Another explanation for the 
comparatively lower Villaraigosa support among 
Blacks is the Times weighting system which 
uses final vote totals including absentee voting. 
As a point of fact, Black absentee voting 
rates and vote preference are unknown by 
both polls. 
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